D.C. Circuit remanded the government`s right of engagement in district court to be considered in the rule of reason68.68 The government decided to drop the application.69 An appeal of the decision coupling before the Supreme Court seems a long way from the fact that the case has developed.70 (7) The lack of purchasing power may prevent the binding company from benefiting from an anti-competitive relationship. Even if some competitors left the cheap bound and barriers to entry were sufficient to prevent a new market, a constraining company facing concentrated demand would not be able to increase the price of its package.153 Where we should be between the rule of reason and the modified legality, a judgment is more difficult. We leave that question for another day. Some categories of commitment agreements may be covered by the amended legality per se – this is the case for technical commitments under U.S. law. Other categories of business binders – the contractual ties of powerful companies in the market – may be covered by the basic rule. It is also quite possible that the application of the structured approach to reason that we propose will lead de facto to a modifiable legitimacy if, in practice, commitment agreements do not pass through the first two screens. For at least three decades, the Supreme Court defined the necessary “economic power” that would involve almost any derogation from perfect competition, until the possession of a copyright, or even the very existence of a tie, gave rise to a presumption of economic power.  In the meantime, the Supreme Court decided that an applicant must determine the market power necessary for other cartel violations in order to demonstrate sufficient “economic power” to establish one.
 More recently, the Court struck down any presumption of market power solely on the basis of patenting or copyright of the binder product.  155. We have come across a number of situations where, in one case, some participants move from the thesis that the link could be anti-competitive, to the conclusion that the link is anti-competitive, without ascertaining whether the hypotheses of the theory are contained in this case. Since 1990, several authors have developed models to relax the conditions under which the link can be anti-competitive. Nalebuff, for example, has developed a model in which a company manufacturing goods A and B has a “credible” incentive to consolidate them to prevent entry.136 Unlike the Whinston model, the commitment complicates market entry, not because the monopoly is required to be the subject of a price war, but because it deprives the operator of an appropriate dimension. Credibility is not a problem here, because even if market entry is not compartmentalized, the price of the good B and the profits of the monopoly are higher than without. Intuition is as follows. As in Carbajo, De Meza and Seidman,137 in the Nalebuff model, are becoming a way for competing companies to differentiate their products and thus ease competition through prices. The monopolist sells both A and B related, while the trader only sells product B.